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MAR 3 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director/Intelligence

FROM : Assistant Director, Scientific Intelligence

SUBJECT : FCDA Request for Estimate on Soviet Guided Missiles

## 1. PROBLEM:

To determine what action should be taken to provide a detailed estimate on Soviet capabilities for short-range and long-range guided missiles in response to the 29 January request from Governor Peterson, FCDA, (See TAB A), and the need of other government agencies for a national intelligence estimate on this subject. (An interim reply to Governor Peterson attached at TAB B was dispatched 13 February 1954.

## 2. DISCUSSION:

- a. Soviet capabilities to attack the United States with guided missiles weapons systems have become a critical national intelligence consideration of the highest importance.
- b. There is no national intelligence estimate extant which contains a detailed treatment of Soviet capabilities re short-range or long-range guided missiles systems that meets the requirements prescribed by FCDA in TAB A.
- c. Under DCID 3/4, dated 14 August 1952, primary responsibility for production of intelligence on guided missiles is allocated to the departments of the Department of Defense and primary responsibility for intelligence on the basic sciences was allocated to CIA. However, experience since this date clearly indicates that it is not possible to separate the long-term basic scientific and technical aspects of guided missiles from the military hardware aspects of missiles, particularly since most missiles are in the research and development stage rather than in the application stage at the present time.
- d. It is believed that the resources of the entire intelligence community are required to adequately treat this problem. A realistic intelligence estimate of Soviet capabilities and probable courses

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of action in this field requires detailed consideration of the basic scientific advances which must be made, the related problems of applied engineering and technology, the impact on the economy, operational capabilities, and underlying military doctrines and philosophy.

- e. I have reviewed the subject problem with Sherman Kent, and we are in agreement that the estimate could be best produced in the following manner:

- (1) Simultaneously with IAC agreement to initiate the estimate, the Director name AD/SI as an ad hoc member of the Board of National Estimates (it being understood that AD/SI would be for the duration of this estimate, the Board member charged with the completion of the paper).
- (2) AD/SI, using O/SI staff and O/NE staff, draft terms of reference to be submitted to the Board of National Estimates.
- (3) The Board of National Estimates at this time would be augmented by as many top scientific consultants as AD/SI feels necessary and sufficient for the task (not all permanent members of the Board would be expected to be present at all subsequent meetings on this paper).
- (4) The procedure with respect to the completion of this estimate would thenceforth be identical to that employed in the production of any NIE, to wit: meetings of agency representatives on terms of reference; allocation of responsibilities; levies on the agencies for contributions; staff drafting in CIA; Board review (Board membership as per 1 and 3 above); Board meetings with the agency representatives (Board membership as per 1 and 3 above); submission to the IAC by AD/SI as Board member responsible for the production of the paper.

### 3. CONCLUSIONS:

- a. Current national intelligence estimates of Soviet guided missiles capabilities are inadequate to support detailed planning by FCDA and other government agencies involved in continental defense planning or in missile development.
- b. The IAC should direct the preparation of a detailed national estimate of the Status of the Soviet Guided Missiles Program through 1960.

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4. **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

- a. This staff study be approved and the IAC be requested (See TAB C) to authorize the production of a National Intelligence Estimate on the Status of the Soviet Guided Missiles Program through 1960, for completion during the third quarter of 1954.
- b. The estimate be produced according to the procedure outlined in 2a above.
- c. The Administrator of FCDA be informed of the implementing action being taken by IAC on his request for a guided missiles estimate.

(Signed R. L. CHADWELL)

for H. MARSHALL CHADWELL

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**CONSIDERATION:**

S/  
AD/RR

Date MAR 3 1954

AD/RR

Date MAR 3 1954

AD/IC

Date \_\_\_\_\_

**ACTION BY APPROVING AUTHORITY:**

Date \_\_\_\_\_

**RECOMMENDED APPROVAL:**

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Deputy Director/Intelligence

**APPROVED:**

MAR 6 1954

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**Attachments: TAPs A - C**

Director of Central Intelligence

OSI/EJZ:IDB:HIM:mjs (2 Mar 54)

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29 January 1954

Honorable Allen W. Dulles  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

Federal Civil Defense Administration must base its plans for the civil defense of this country on the best and latest intelligence. The estimates of Soviet capabilities produced by your Agency, as well as pertinent National Security Council documents, are the best basis for such planning.

For the present, and for some years to come, we believe that the principal threat to the continental United States is that of nuclear weapons delivered by manned aircraft. Under present conditions of warning, we can advocate only a "duck and cover" doctrine for people, utilizing the shelter provided by existing buildings and some dispersal of equipment. We are, however, approaching the time when the progress of presently planned warning systems will give us a reasonable chance of receiving enough advance warning to make it practicable to plan for a dispersal of the populations of our principal cities. As the warning system increases in effectiveness our civil defense plans will be modified to meet the new developments.

At some time in the not too distant future this situation may change radically. When the Soviet Union succeeds in developing a true intercontinental ballistic missile of reasonable accuracy and capable of carrying an atomic warhead, all defense plans based on the detection and warning systems would have to be re-evaluated. If no effective warning can be expected, the civil defense problem cannot be met by relying on emergency dispersal of people, and must be re-examined from the ground up.

For this reason it would be extremely helpful to us to know the potentialities of the Soviet long-range guided missile programs as far in advance as possible. There are available to us various brief statements on the subject, ranging from the NLS series to Section 25 of SE 36/1, but these do not meet our requirements, either as to detail or projection into the future. I am, therefore, requesting you to furnish us an estimate of Soviet capabilities in the field of long-range guided missiles, giving your opinion on probable ranges

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and weight of the weapon and its accuracy of aim with at least a minimum data at which we can expect them to exist in operational numbers. While our main interest is in these long-range weapons, we would also like to have your latest estimate of Soviet progress in the shorter range missiles suitable for launching from submarines or surface ships, as well as developments in air-to-ground types.

I would naturally like to have these estimates as soon as possible. However, it is more important to have a complete round-up and a thorough evaluation of all the available information in a few months than to have a hurried job in a matter of weeks. I do not wish to appear to set a deadline on this request, but we would like to have the study by the middle of May, if you think it reasonable. The paper will be used only in our Washington office, and it is not to be given to State or local authorities, so that a high security classification will not be an inconvenience.

Sincerely,

Val Petersen

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**TAB D**

**C O P Y**

13 February 1954

The Honorable Val Peterson  
Administrator  
Federal Civil Defense Administration  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Governor Peterson:

This will acknowledge your letter of 29 January 1954, which requests estimates on Soviet guided missiles. All of us in the intelligence community share your concern regarding possible Soviet advances in this critical field.

We are giving your request careful consideration, and I hope that we shall be able to meet your needs. After discussing this matter with the chiefs of the other intelligence agencies, who share with me the responsibility for guided missile intelligence, I shall write you again.

Sincerely,

/s/

Allen W. Dulles  
Director

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TAB

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TAB C

## INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

## Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles

1. The Administrator of the Federal Civil Defense Administration has submitted to the Director of Central Intelligence the attached letter requesting estimates on Soviet capabilities in the field of guided missiles.

2. At present, there is no National Intelligence Estimate extant which presents detailed estimates of Soviet capabilities and intentions to develop short-range or long-range missiles.

3. It is believed that the resources of the entire intelligence community are required to adequately treat this problem. A realistic intelligence estimate of Soviet capabilities and probable courses of action in this field requires detailed consideration of the basic scientific advances which must be made, the related problems of applied engineering and technology, the impact on the economy, operational capabilities, and underlying military doctrines and philosophy.

4. Although there is little direct information available on this subject, it is believed that a reasonably reliable national estimate can be derived with the help of a detailed review of all of the evidence at hand by intelligence officers (working together with a small group of key U.S. authorities knowledgeable on all aspects of a guided missiles program) against a theoretical frame of reference consisting of the scientific, technical, and economic accomplishments required to develop and produce guided missiles which constitute a threat against U.S. interests.

5. Therefore, it is requested that the IAC approve undertaking a National Intelligence Estimate on the status of the Soviet guided missiles program through 1960. This estimate to be completed during the third quarter of 1954.

RICHARD D. DRAIN  
Secretary

Attachment: FCDA letter dated 29 January 1954

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